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Humans tend to imitate the actions of their social partners and such imitative behavior is seen as a hallmark feature of social interaction (Heyes, 2011) . Previous research in biology, neuroscience, and psychology has delineated numerous functions of imitation behavior (Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961; Heyes, 2011) , its development (Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977) , and its neural implementation (Heyes, 2010; Iacoboni et al., 1999) . Paradoxically, however, all these studies focused on just one side of this social interaction, namely on the imitating observer, whereas the imitated model is typically considered a passive provider of the action in question.
Yet imitative behavior might have a unique function for the action model itself. Because imitation occurs automatically after model actions (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001) , imitative responses are an immediate and predictable action consequence for the model. In turn, cumulative evidence indicates that voluntary motor actions are controlled by anticipating their to-be-expected sensory consequences (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Kunde, 2001; Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010) . Specifically, the anticipation of such consequences automatically activates the motor pattern which normally produces them (Hommel et al., 2001; Kunde, 2001; Pfister, Kiesel, & Melcher, 2010) . We suggest that imitative behavior -a reliable consequence of own actions -fulfills a similar function: It serves as mental cue for the model to retrieve its own body movements.
To demonstrate this function, two participants, a model and an imitator, sat face-to-face at a table and operated one response button each (Fig. 1) . The model viewed a computer screen and reacted as quickly as possible to a color stimulus by performing either a short or a long button press. The second participant responded to the model's action as quickly as possible by either imitating or counter-imitating the model action in separate blocks of the experiment (i.e., in the counter-imitation condition, the imitator performed a long key press in response to a short model action, and vice versa). Both participants performed in both roles. In keeping with previous findings, we expected the imitator to respond faster in the imitation condition than in the counter-imitation condition (Brass et al., 2000; Heyes, 2011; Ondobaka, de Lange, Wiemers, Newman-Norlund, & Bekkering, 2012) : Seeing a particular action evokes a tendency to do the same, which speeds up actions in the imitation condition but creates response conflict in the counter-imitation condition. Importantly, however, we Imitation and anticipation 4 expected a similar effect in the model: Anticipating the imitator's response should facilitate action selection if this anticipation matches, and thus primes, the required model action. Conversely, it should impair response selection when the anticipated action mismatches and thus competes with the to-be-produced action (Kunde, 2001 (Kunde, , 2003 ). An imitation effect that occurs in the imitator by observing the model's action might consequently occur in the model by merely anticipating the imitator's response.
[ 
Methods
We tested 24 participants (mean age: 21.0 years, 7 males, 1 left-handed). During the instruction, we referred to the roles of the participants as "leader" and "follower" to avoid the terms of models and imitators. In each trial, the screen color changed from black to either red or green, prompting the model to perform either a short (1-150 ms) or a long (200-600 ms) key press. Color-response mapping was counterbalanced across participant pairs. In separate blocks, the imitator either imitated or counter-imitated the model action and the screen went blank after this response. The next trial started after 1000 ms. Each session began with 14 practice trials to acquaint the participants with the concepts of "long" and "short" key presses. The actual experiment consisted of 20 blocks of 24 trials each and participants switched their roles after the first half of the experiment. Each half comprised 5 blocks with normal imitation responses and 5 blocks with counter-imitation responses with condition order being counterbalanced across participant pairs.
The first block of each condition was considered practice. For analysis of the model RT data, we further excluded trials with errors of the model (6.1%). For the analysis of the imitator RT data, we excluded trials with errors in either response (13.2%). RTs were then subjected to an outliercorrection with outliers being defined as deviating more than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean of the analyzed design cell, calculated separately for each participant (< 2.5% for all analyses). To avoid violations of sphericity, we used the multivariate approach to within-subjects analyses of variance (ANOVA) for all reported ANOVA statistics. All pairwise comparisons were performed via paired-samples t-tests.
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Results
As predicted, models indeed initiated their actions significantly faster when these actions were to be imitated rather than counter-imitated ( Fig. 2A) , t(23) = 4.35, p < .001, d = 1.26. In line with prior findings (Brass et al., 2000; Heyes, 2011) , these differences were also present for the imitator (Fig.   2B ), t(23) = 4.49, p < .001, d = 1.30. Follow-up analyses showed that these effects occurred for each type of response and did not result from different speed-accuracy trade-offs (Fig. S1 ). Furthermore, we performed a more detailed distribution anaysis of the RT data to ensure that the above effects were not just driven by a small subset of trials with extremeley delayed responses, e.g., in which participants were confused by the incompatible consequences of their actions. This 2 x 5 repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors imitator response (normal imitation vs. counterimitation) and distribution quintile indeed confirmed that the imitation effects in both roles were reliable across the entire RT distribution. For the model (Fig. 2C) , the distribution analysis showed both main effects to be significant (p's < .001). A significant interaction indicated larger imitation effects for longer response times (Kunde, 2001) , F(4,20) = 4.34, p = .011, η p 2 = 0.46, but a reliable difference between imitation and counter-imitation responses was present from the first quintile onward (Fig. S2) . The same was true for the imitator ( Fig. 2D ; see also Fig. S2 ).
[ Conceivably, action priming by action observation (when acting as imitator) is a process distinct from action priming by action anticipation (when acting as model).
Control Experiment
In a second experiment with 16 new participants (mean age: 27.4 years, 3 males, all righthanded) we confirmed that the imitation effect in the model comprises both, benefits of imitation and costs of counter-imitation. We replaced the counter-imitation condition by a neutral condition where 
Discussion
The present experiments investigated the function of imitative behavior for action models. Model actions were facilitated when they were predictably imitated rather than counter-imitated by an observer (Experiment 1). A reduced facilitation effect was also present when comparing imitation to unpredictable responses of the imitator (Experiment 2). These findings demonstrate that models build a representation of an observer's imitative response prior to executing their own actions. Thus, not only do anticipated consequences in the inanimate environment guide motor actions (Hommel et al., 2001; Kunde, 2001; Shin et al., 2010) , but so do consequences in the social environment, that is, in other people's behavior.
The results also point toward notable differences between the anticipation of consequences in the inanimate and the social environment. Whereas previous measures for the anticipation of inanimate consequences were shown to be driven mainly by interference from incompatible consequences (Pfister et al., 2010) , the present findings indicate both, interference by anticipating Imitation and anticipation 7 counter-imitation responses and considerable facilitation by anticipating imitation responses -as suggested by the differential effect sizes in Experiment 1 and 2, respectively (35 ms vs. 18 ms).
Moreover, compared to studies with the same motor actions (short vs. long key presses) but inanimate action consequences (short or long tones, Kunde 2003) , the present imitation effects were considerably larger, which reminds of generally stronger influences of social as compared to inanimate stimuli on motor priming. Such priming effects refer to the facilitation of motor responses that are carried out to biologically similar target stimuli (such as the imitator responses in the present imitation condition; cf. Brass et al., 2000) . These effects have been shown to consist of two components: Action priming by spatial compatibility on the one hand, and action priming by imitative compatibility on the other hand (Bertenthal, Longo, & Kosobud, 2006; Boyer, Longo, & Bertenthal, 2012) . Conceivably, this distinction might also apply to the present anticipatory effect which is certainly an interesting question for future research.
The pronounced impact of anticipated social consequences of own actions might also explain findings from developmental psychology, namely "imitative games" between infants and their parents (Agnetta & Rochat, 2004) . Even neonates tend to repeat actions that were previously imitated by a human agent. Furthermore, neonates use cycles of reciprocal action initiation and imitation as an early form of communication with their parents (Nagy, 2006; Nagy & Molnar, 2004) . This type of communicative action might be mediated by anticipative mechanisms as demonstrated in the present study. Observed changes of other people's behavior thus seem to be readily included in the human motor system and are directly relevant for controlling own actions. Moreover, changes of other people's behavior are the external cues for changes of their minds, which according to philosophical approaches is the very essence of truly communicative action (Grice, 1969) . It might therefore be more important for the understanding of communicative action to study the cognitive processes in acting models rather than in imitating observers. When the screen changed from black to either red or green, the model performed a short (1-150 ms)
or long (200-600 ms) key press, respectively. In separate blocks, the imitator either imitated or counter-imitated the model action. significantly faster when this action was expected to be imitated rather than counter-imitated.
This finding suggests a functional role of imitative behavior not only for the imitator but also for the model; imitative responses serve as mental retrieval cues for own actions. (B)
Participants were also faster at imitating an action than at counter-imitating it. (C+D) Both effects were reliable across the entire RT distribution (Fig. S2) . Error-bars (top row) and colored area (bottom row) indicate within-subjects standard errors, computed separately for each pairwise comparison. obtained for participants in their role as model and as imitator. The effects were uncorrelated, implying distinct processes in both roles.
